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Abstract
Over the past decade, wireless applications have experienced tremendous growth, and this growth is likely to
multiply in the near future. To cope with expected drastic data traffic growth, a new cloud computing-based radio
access network (C-RAN) has been proposed for next-generation cellular networks. It is considered as a cost-efficient
way of meeting high resource demand of future wireless access networks. In this paper, we propose a novel
resource sharing scheme for future C-RAN systems. Based on the Indian buffet game, we formulate the C-RAN
resource allocation problem as a two-level game model and find an effective solution according to the coopetition
approach. Our proposed scheme constantly monitors the current C-RAN system conditions and adaptively responds
in a distributed manner. The experimental results validate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed scheme
under dynamic C-RAN situations.
Keywords: Cloud radio access network, Indian buffet game, Resource allocation, Two-level game model,
Asymptotic shapley value, Coopetition approach
1 Introduction
In recent years, the radio access network (RAN) is com-
monly used to support the exponential growth of mobile
communications. Conceptually, RAN resides among net-
work devices such as a mobile phone, a computer, or
any remotely controlled machine and provides connec-
tions with core networks. However, traditional RAN
architecture has been faced with a number of challenges.
First, a highly loaded base station (BS) cannot share pro-
cessing power with other idle or less loaded BSs; it re-
sults in a poor resource utilization. Second, a BS
equipment serves only radio frequency channels in each
physical cell, where BS’s resources cannot be shared with
other BSs in different cells. Finally, BSs built on propri-
etary hardware cannot have a flexibility to upgrade radio
networks [1, 2].
To overcome these problems, cloud computing-based
radio access network (C-RAN) is widely considered as a
promising paradigm, which can bridge the gap between
the wireless communication demands of end users and
the capacity of radio access networks. To meet users’
high resource demands, the C-RAN consolidates BSs to
a central cloud and takes a benefit from the cloud com-
puting elasticity, which allows dynamic provisioning of
cloud BS resources [1, 3]. In C-RAN, the baseband pro-
cessing unit (BPU) of traditional BSs is pooled and
moved into a centralized location. By virtualization, the
computing resources in the BPU pool can be dynamic-
ally shared among all the cells in the network while
allowing a significant improvement in computing re-
source utilization and power efficiency. Currently, there
have been a number of researches on the computing re-
source allocation for the virtualized BPUs. However, they
are not realizable in a practical system because of the
computational complexity [4].
Game theory is the formal study of conflict and co-
operation and can be used to model a multiplayer
decision-making process and to analyze the manner in
which players interact with each other during this
process. Therefore, the concepts of game theory provide
a language in which to formulate, structure, analyze, and
understand strategic scenarios. This concept drew great
attentions in both areas of economics and computer sci-
ence [5]. In 2013, C. Jiang introduced the fundamental
notion of an Indian buffet game to study how game
players make multiple concurrent selections under un-
certain system states [6]. Specifically, the Indian buffet
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game model can reveal how players learn the uncertainty
through social learning and make optimal decisions to
maximize their own expected utilities by considering
negative network externality [7]. This game model is
well suited for the C-RAN resource sharing problem.
Motivated by the above discussion, we design a new
C-RAN resource sharing scheme based on the Indian
game model. The key feature of our scheme is to de-
velop a decentralized mechanism according to the two-
level coopetition approach. The term “coopetition” is a
neologism coined to describe cooperative competition.
Therefore, coopetition is defined as the phenomenon
that differs from competition or cooperation and stresses
two faces, i.e., cooperation and competition, of one rela-
tionship in the same situation [8]. In this study, our pro-
posed game model consists of two levels: the upper- and
lower-level Indian buffet games. At the upper-level
game, cloud resources are shared in a cooperative man-
ner. At the lower-level game, allocated resources are dis-
tributed in a non-cooperative manner. Based on the
hierarchical interconnection of the two game models,
control decisions can cause cascade interactions to reach
a mutually satisfactory solution.
Usually, different C-RAN agents may pursue different
interests and act individually to maximize their own
profits. This self-organizing feature can add autonomics
into C-RAN systems and help to ease the heavy burden
of complex centralized control algorithms. Based on the
recursive best-response algorithm, we draw on the con-
cept of a learning perspective and investigate some of
the reasons and probable lines for justifying each system
agent’s behavior. The dynamics of the interactive feed-
back learning mechanism can allow control decisions to
be dynamically adjustable. In addition, by employing the
coopetition approach, control decisions are mutually
dependent on each other to resolve conflicting perform-
ance criteria.
1.1 Related work
Over the years, a lot of state-of-the-art research work
on the C-RAN resource sharing problem has been
conducted [4, 9, 10]. The baseband processing units
virtualization (BPUV) scheme [4] was proposed for
the baseband processing unit virtualization. It was
formulated as a bin packing problem, where each
baseband processing unit was treated as a bin with fi-
nite computing resources, expressed in million opera-
tions per time-slot (MOPTS). In addition, the
dynamics of the cell traffic load was treated as an
item that needed to be packed into the bins with the
size equal to the computing resources in MOPTS, re-
quired to support the traffic load. To solve the
optimization problem and simultaneously improve the
standard solver for the bin packing problem, the
BPUV scheme was designed based on a heuristic sim-
ulated annealing approach [4].
The joint cloud computing and network (JCCN)
scheme [9] was proposed to jointly study dynamic cloud
and wireless network operations so as to improve end-
to-end performance in the mobile cloud computing en-
vironment. This scheme considered not only the
spectrum efficiency in wireless networks but also the
pricing information in the cloud, based on which power
allocation and interference management in wireless net-
works were performed. The JCCN scheme formulated
the problems of cloud media service price decision, re-
source allocation, and the interference management in
the mobile cloud computing environment as a three-
level Stackelberg game [9].
The cloud provider’s resource sharing (CPRS) scheme
[10] was developed to study the cooperative behavior of
multiple cloud providers. In the CPRS scheme, a hier-
archical cooperative game model was designed; it was
composed of two interrelated cooperative games to
analyze the decisions of cloud providers to support in-
ternal users and to offer service to public cloud users. In
the lower-level, the CPRS scheme implemented a sto-
chastic linear programming game model to study the re-
source and revenue sharing for a given coalition of cloud
providers. In the upper-level, the CPRS scheme formu-
lated the coalitional game for which the cloud providers
can form the groups of cooperation to share resource
and revenue. Finally, the analytical model based on a
Markov chain was used to obtain stable coalitional
structure [10]. All the earlier work has attracted a lot of
attention and introduced unique challenges to efficiently
solve the resource sharing problem in C-RAN systems.
Compared to these schemes [4, 9] and [10], our pro-
posed scheme attains better system performance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we outline the C-RAN architecture in de-
tail. Section 3 describes the Indian buffet game model
for C-RAN systems. And then, the proposed algorithm
is explained step by step in Section 4. In Section 5, we
show the simulation results. Through simulation, we
show the ability of the proposed scheme to achieve high
accuracy and promptness in dynamic C-RAN environ-
ments. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 6.
2 Cloud radio access network architecture
The C-RAN is a novel mobile network architecture,
which has a potential to optimize cost and energy
consumption in the field of mobile networks. In C-
RAN systems, there are multiple cloud providers
(CPs), which can generate more revenue from the
sharing of available resources. CPs have their system
resources, such as a CPU core, memory, storage, and
network bandwidth. To ensure the optimal usage of
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cloud resources, baseband processing is centralized in
a virtualized baseband units pool (VBP). The VBP can
be shared by different CPs and multiple BSs. There-
fore, the VBP is in a unique position as a cloud bro-
kering between the BSs and the CPs for cloud
services while increasing resource efficiency and sys-
tem throughput [11].
In the RAN architecture, a small base station (SBS)
covers a small area and communicates with the mo-
bile users (MUs) through wireless links. SBSs provide
the managed connectivity and offer flexibility in real-
time demands. To improve C-RAN system efficiency,
CPs can offer their available resources to SBSs
through the VBP, and SBSs can provide services to
MUs based on their obtained resources. Without loss
of generality, each SBS is assumed to acts as a virtual
machine, and MUs’ applications are executed through
the virtualization technology. The general architecture
of a hierarchical C-RAN system is shown in Fig. 1.
In this study, we consider a C-RAN architecture
with one VBP, 10 SBSs, and 100 MUs, and system re-
sources are the computing capacities of CPU, mem-
ory, storage, and bandwidth. These resources can be
used by the MUs through the VBP to gain more rev-
enue. For the rest of this paper, we refer the
organization that CPs cooperate to form a logical
pool of computing resources to support MUs’ applica-
tions. Each MU application service has its own
application type and requires different resource
requirements.
3 Indian buffet game model for C-RAN systems
Let us consider an Indian buffet restaurant which provides
m dishes denoted by d1, d2,…, dm. Each dish can be shared
among multiple guests. Each guest can select sequentially
multiple dishes to get different meals. The utility of each
dish can be interpreted as the deliciousness and quantity.
All guests are rational in the sense that they will select
dishes which can maximize their own satisfactions. In
such a case, the multiple dish-selection problem can be
formulated to be a non-cooperative game, called the In-
dian buffet game. In the traditional Indian buffet game,
the main goal is to study how guests in a buffet restaurant
learn the uncertain dishes’ states and make multiple con-
current decisions by not only considering the current util-
ity but also taking into account the influence of
subsequent players’ decisions [5, 7].
During the C-RAN system operations, system
agents should make decisions individually. In this
situation, a main issue for each agent is how to per-
form well by considering the mutual interaction rela-
tionship and dynamically adjust their decisions to
maximize their own profits. In this study, we develop
a new C-RAN system resource sharing scheme based
on the Indian buffet game model. In our proposed
scheme, the dynamic operation of VBP, SBSs, and
MUs is formulated as a two-level Indian buffet game.
At the first stage, the VBP and SBSs play the upper-
level Indian buffet game; the VBP distribute the avail-
able resources to each SBS by using a cooperative
manner. At the second stage, multiple MUs decide to
Fig. 1 Hierarchical C-RAN system structure
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purchase the resource from their corresponding SBS
by employing a non-cooperative manner. Based on
this hierarchical coopetition approach, we assume that
all game players (VBP, SBSs, and MUs) are rational
and independent of gaining the profit as much as
possible. Therefore, for the implementation practical-
ity, our proposed scheme is designed in an entirely
distributed and self-organizing interactive fashion.
Mathematically, our upper-level Indian buffet game (GU )
can be defined as GU ¼ ℕ; D; Sif gi∈ℕ; Uif gi∈ℕ; T
 
at
each time period t of gameplay.
 ℕ is the finite set of players ℕ ¼ C;ℬf g where C
= {VBP} represents one VBP and ℬ = {b1,…, bn} is a
set of multiple SBSs, which are assumed as guests in
the upper-level Indian restaurant.
 D is the finite set of resources D ¼ d1f , d2,…, dl} in
the VBP. Elements in D metaphorically represent
different dishes on the buffet table in the upper-level
Indian restaurant.
 Si is the set of strategies with the player i. If the
player i is the VBP, i.e., i∈C, a strategy set can be









distribution status of kth resource, i.e., 1 ≤ k ≤ l. If
the player i is a SBS, i.e., i∈ℬ, the player i can
request multiple resources. Therefore, the strategy
set can be defined as a combination of requested

























}} where ℐki is the player i’s
requested amount for the kth resource; each player’s
strategy set is finite with 2l elements.
 The Ui is the payoff received by the player i. If the
player i is the VBP, i.e., i∈C, it is the total profit
obtained from the resource distribution for SBSs. If
the player i is a SBS, i.e., i∈ℬ, the payoff is
determined as the outcomes of the distributed
resources minus the cost of corresponding
resources.
 The T is a time period. The GU is repeated t∈ T
< ∞ time periods with imperfect information.
Based on the distributed resources, SBSs are respon-
sible to support MUs’ services while ensuring the re-
quired quality of service (QoS). Usually, SBSs deploy
sparsely with each other to avoid mutual interference
and are operated in a time-slotted manner. To formulate
interactions between SBSs and MUs, our lower-level
Indian buffet game ( GL ) can be defined as GL
¼ ℙ; ℒ if gi∈ℙ; Tif gi∈ℙ; Uif gi∈ℙ; T
 
at each time period
t of gameplay.
 ℙ is the finite set of players ℙ ¼ ℬ;Xf g where ℬ
= {b1,…, bn} is a set of multiple SBSs and X = {x1,…,
xm} is a set of multiple MUs, which are assumed
guests in the lower-level Indian restaurant.
 ℒ i ¼ ℛ1i

, ℛ2i ,…, ℛ
l
ig is the finite set of the player
i’s resources, i.e., i∈ℬ. Elements in ℒi
metaphorically represent different dishes on the
buffet table in the ith lower-level Indian restaurant;
there are total n lower-level Indian restaurants.
 Ti is the set of strategies with the player i. If the
player i is a SBS, i.e., i∈ℬ, the strategy set can be








i is the price of
the kth resource in the ith SBS. If the player i is a
MU, i.e., i∈X , the player i can request multiple
resources. Therefore, the strategy set can be defined


























}} where ξki is the MU i’s request amount for
the kth resource.
 The Ui is the payoff received by the player i. If the
player i is a SBS, i.e., i∈ℬ, it is the total profit
obtained from the resource allocation for MUs. If
the player i is a MU, i.e., i∈X , the payoff is
determined as the outcomes of the allocated
resources minus the cost of corresponding
resources.
 The T is a time period. The GL is repeated t∈ T
< ∞ time periods with imperfect information.
4 Proposed resource sharing algorithm in C-RAN
systems
In this section, we present our resource sharing algo-
rithm, which employs a hierarchical two-level approach.
And then, the proposed scheme is described strategically
in a nine-step procedure through the coopetition
concept.
4.1 C-RAN resource sharing in the upper Indian buffet
game
In this sub-section, we consider the upper-level In-
dian buffet game. In C-RAN systems, there are mul-
tiple resource types, and multiple SBSs request
different resources to the VBP. In this study, we
mainly consider four resource types: CPU, memory,
storage, and network bandwidth. Let D denote a set
of resources in the VBP; D ¼ d1f = CPU; d2 = mem-
ory; d3 = storage; d4 = bandwidth } where each d
represents the available amount of corresponding re-
source. Virtualization technology is used to collect
these resources from CPs, and they are dynamically
shared among SBSs. In our upper-level Indian buffet
game, there are one VBP and n SBSs. The VBP is re-
sponsible for the cloud resource control and distrib-
utes resources over multiple SBSs. Each SBS is
deployed for each microcell and covers relatively a
small area. In general, SBSs are situated around high
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traffic density hot spots to support QoS-ensured ap-
plications. To get an effective solution for the upper-
level Indian game, we focused on the basic concept
of the shapley value (SV). It is a well-known solution
idea for ensuring an equitable division, i.e., the fairest
allocation, of collectively gained profits among the
several collaborative players [5].
When the requested amount of kth resource (∂ki , 1 ≤
k ≤ 4) of the ith SBS (SBSi) is less than the distributed
resource (Aki ), i.e., ∂ki < Aki ; the SBSi can waste this
excess resource, and the property loss is estimated
based on the resource unit price (UP ik ). UP ik value is
adaptively adjusted in the lower-level Indian buffet
game; it is discussed in Section 4.3. In this case, the
value function (v(SBSi)) of the SBSi becomes v SBSið Þ
¼ −UP ik  Aki −∂ki
 
. Conversely, if ∂ki > Aki , the defi-
cient resource amount ∂ki −Aki
 
is needed in the SBSi.
Therefore, the value function becomes v SBSið Þ ¼ UP ik
 ∂ki −Aki
 
. We assume that ℕ = {C = {VBP}∪ℬ = {b1,
…, bn}} is a set of upper game players and v(·) is a real
valued function defined on all subsets of ℬ satisfying
v(∅) = 0. Therefore, in our game model, a nonempty
subset (c) of ℬ is called a coalition. A set of games with
a finite number of players is denoted by Γ. Given a
game (ℬ, v(·)) ∈ Γ, let ℂk be a coalition structure of ℬ
for the kth resource. In particular, ℂk ¼ ck1; …; ckj
n o
is
a partition of ℬ, that is, ckf ∩ c
k




Let θ be an order on ℬ, that is, θ is a bijection on
ℬ. A set of all the orders on ℬ is denoted by Θ(ℬ)
[12, 13]. A set of game players preceding the player i
for the kth resource at order θ is Aθi kð Þ ¼




v Aθi kð Þ



























s:t:; x½ þ ¼ max x; 0ð Þ
A marginal contribution of the player i at order θ in





. Then the SV of (ℬ, v(·), k) is defined as follows
[12]:




Sθi ℬ; v; kð Þ
 
; for all i∈ℬ
ð2Þ
where | · | represents the cardinality of the set. There-
fore, the SV is an average of marginal contribution vec-
tors where each order θ ∈Θ(ℬ) occurs in an equal
probability, that is, 1/|Θ(ℬ)|. Under the cooperative
game situation, SV provides a unique solution with the
desirable properties: (i) efficiency, (ii) symmetry, (iii) ad-
ditivity, and (iv) dummy [5, 12].
Although the SV is quite an interesting concept, and
provides an optimal and fair solution for many applica-
tions, its main drawback is its computational complexity:
the number of computations will increase prohibitively
when the number of game players increases. Therefore,
applications that utilize the SV remain scarce [12, 13]. In
this study, if all possible orderings of SBSs (Θ(ℬ)) have
to be taken into account in calculating Eqs. (1) and (2),
the computational complexity of calculating the SV can
be very high and too heavy to be implemented in real C-
RAN operations. To resolve this problem, we adopt the
new concept of an asymptotic shapley value (A_SV) ap-
proach, which is an approximation method for the SV
under a large number of players [12, 13]. For the kth re-




















A ∂ki −Aki  ; if μks  NksμkB  NkB ¼ 1









s:t:; erf xð Þ ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ















s  Nks−μkB  NkBﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ℬ
p
where Nks and N
k
B are the number of players with the
condition of ∂k−Ak < 0 and the condition of ∂k−Ak ≥ 0,









mean (or variance) of total wasted and needed kth re-
source, respectively. The method for obtaining the proof
of the derivation of A_SV value can be found in [13].
Under dynamic C-RAN environments, fixed resource
distribution methods cannot effectively adapt to chan-
ging system conditions. In this study, we treat the re-
source distribution for multiple SBSs as an online
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decision problem. At the time period t, the total amount
of available kth resource ( Aℛtk ) is dynamically re-
distributed over SBSs according to ϕk values. In order to
apply the time-driven implementation of resource re-
distribution, we partition the time axis into equal inter-
vals of length unit_time. At the end of each time period,
the re-distributed kth resource amount for the SBSi (Πki
(t)) is obtained periodically as follows.
Πki tð Þ ¼ Aℛtk 
ϕki þ minj∈ℬ ϕkj
n o			 			X
b∈ℬ
ϕkb þ minj∈ℬ ϕkj
n o			 			  ; s:t:; t∈T
ð4Þ
4.2 C-RAN resource sharing in a lower-level Indian buffet
game
In the lower-level Indian game model, multiple MUs re-
quest different resources to their corresponding SBS. Let
MUji be the MU j in the area of SBSi and ℒi denote a set
of resources in the ith SBS; ℒi = {ℛ1i = CPU, ℛ
2
i = mem-
ory, ℛ3i = storage, ℛ
4
i = bandwidth}. Each ℛ
k
i represents
the available amount of kth resource in the SBSi; these
resources are obtained from the VBP through the upper-
level Indian game. Individual MU attempts to actually
purchase multiple resources based on their unit prices
UP ik , where 1 ≤ k ≤ 4 and i ∈ℬ.
Our lower-level Indian game deals with the resource
allocation problem while maximizing resource efficien-
cies. Based on the reciprocal relationship between SBSs
and MUs, we adaptively allocate SBSs’ resources to each
MU. From the viewpoint of MUs, their payoffs corres-
pond to the received benefit minus the incurred cost
[14]. Based on its expected payoff, each MU attempts to
find the best actions. The MU j’s utility function of kth





¼ bj ξkj ið Þ
 







¼ ωkj  log ξkj ið Þ
 
and mpk ≤ UP ik ≤
Mpk
where ξkj ið Þ is the MU j’s requested amount of kth re-




is the received benefit
for the MU j. ωkj represents a payment that the MU j
would spend for the kth resource based on its perceived
worth. The UP ik is the unit price for the kth resource
unit in the SBSi and c UP ik ið Þ; ξkj ið Þ
 
is the cost func-
tion of SBSi. Each SBS decides the UP ik between the
pre-defined minimum (mpk) and the maximum (Mpk)
price boundaries. In general, a received benefit typically
follows a model of diminishing returns to scale; MU’s
marginal benefit diminishes with increasing bandwidth
[14]. Based on this consideration, our received benefit
can be represented in a general form of log function. In
a distributed self-regarding fashion, each individual MU
is independently interested in the sole goal of maximiz-













−c UP ik ið Þ; ξkj ið ÞÞg
n
ð6Þ
From the viewpoint of SBSs, the most important cri-
terion is a total revenue; it is defined as the sum of pay-
ments from MUs [15]. Based on the UP ik and the total
allocated resource amounts for MU’s, the total revenue


















UP ik  ξkj ið Þ lkj ið Þ
 
ð7Þ
s.t., lkj ið Þ =




where n, l, and m are the total number of SBSs, re-
sources, and MUs, respectively. Each SBS adaptively
controls its own UPk to maximize the revenue in a dis-
tributed manner. Our traffic model is assumed based on
the elastic demand paradigm; according to the current
UPk , MUs can adapt their resource requests. It is rele-
vant in real-world situations where MUs’ requests may
be influenced by the price [16, 17]. In response to ωkj ,
the MU j can derive the ξkj ið Þ ¼ ωkj =UP ik
 
. In the
SBSi, the total requested resource amount from corre-

















When the price is low, more MUs are attracted to par-
ticipate in C-RAN services because of the good satisfac-
tory payoff. However, if the price is high, MUs’ requests
are reduced because of the unsatisfactory payoff. There-
fore, to deal with the congestion problem, a higher price
is suitable to match the resource capacity constraint
while reducing the potential demands. In order to
achieve the demand-supply balance, the current price
should increase or decrease by ΔUPk .
In our proposed scheme, SBSs individually take ac-
count of previous price strategies to update their beliefs
about what is the best-response price strategy in the
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future. If a strategy change can bring a higher payoff,
SBSs have a tendency to move in the direction of that
successful change, and vice versa. Therefore, SBSs dy-
namically tune their current strategies based on the pay-
off history. For the kth resource, the SBSi’s price strategy
at the time period t + 1 (λki (t + 1)) is defined as
λki t þ 1ð Þ ¼ Λ λki tð Þ þ ΔUP ik tð Þ
		 		
 ; If Ω > 0
λki t þ 1ð Þ ¼ Λ λki tð Þ− ΔUP ik tð Þ
		 		




s.t., ΔUP ik tð Þ ¼ Ψ
k
i tð Þ−Ψ ki t−1ð Þð Þ
Ψ t−1i t−1ð Þ
, Ω ¼ λ
k
i tð Þ−λki t−1ð Þð Þ
ΔUP ik tð Þ , and
Λ K½  ¼
Λ K½  ¼ mpk ; if K < mpk
Λ K½  ¼ K ; if mpk≤K≤Mpk
Λ K½  ¼ Mpk ; if K > Mpk
8<
:
where Ψ ki tð Þ and λki tð Þ are the SBSi’s revenue and price
strategy for the kth resource at the time period t, re-
spectively. ΔUP ik tð Þ
		 		 represents the absolute value of Δ
UP ik tð Þ . According to Eq (7), the strategy profile of all
SBSs can be denoted by a n × l matrix as follows:















; λl1 tð Þ
; λl2 tð Þ
⋮






4.3 The main steps of the proposed algorithm
For the advanced wireless processing and reduced cost,
C-RAN architecture is an attractive and innovative idea
in both academic and industry fields. It can effectively
support growing users’ needs. In this study, we present a
novel C-RAN resource sharing scheme based on the
two-level Indian buffet game model. In the upper-level
Indian buffet game, available resources of CPs are dis-
tributed to SBSs based on the concept of A_SV. In the
lower-level Indian buffet game, Individual SBS allocate
the distributed resources to MUs according to the non-
cooperative manner. Based on our coopetition paradigm,
the VBU, SBSs, and MUs repeatedly interact with each
other to effectively share the C-RAN resources. There-
fore, in the proposed scheme, strategy decisions are
coupled with one another; the result of the each player’s
decisions is the input back to the other player’s decision
process. The dynamics of the hierarchical feedback
mechanism can cause cascade interactions of game
players, and they can make their decisions to quickly
find the most profitable solution while improving re-
source utilization and MUs’ satisfactions. In a constantly
changing C-RAN system environment, it is a practical
and suitable approach. The main steps of our resource
sharing scheme are given next.
Step 1: At the initial time, all SBSs have same price
strategies (T ). At the beginning of the game,
this starting guess is a reasonable assumption.
Step 2: At each game period, the VBP collects available
resources from CPs using the virtualization
technology and distributes these resources to
each SBS according to Eqs. (1)–(4).
Step 3: Individual MU in each cell attempts to actually
purchase multiple resources from
corresponding SBS. Based on this information,
each SBS dynamically decides the price strategy
(T ) using Eqs. (6) and (7).
Step 4: At each game period, the VBP re-distributes
periodically the CP resources based on the cur-
rently calculating values; it is the upper-level
Indian game.
Step 5: Based on the current price (T ), each MU
dynamically decides the amount of purchasing
resources according to Eq. (6).
Step 6: Strategy decisions for each game player are
made in an entirely distributed manner.
Step 7: Under widely diverse C-RAN environments, the
VBP, SBSs, and MUs are self-monitoring con-
stantly based on the iterative feedback
mechanism.
Step 8: If the change of prices in all SBSs is within a
pre-defined bound (ε), this change is negligible;
proceed to step 9. Otherwise, proceed to step 2
for the next iteration.
Step 9: Game is temporarily over. Ultimately, the
proposed scheme reaches an effective resource
sharing solution. When the C-RAN system sta-
tus is changed, it can re-trigger another game-
based resource sharing procedure.
5 Performance evaluation
In this section, the effectiveness of our proposed scheme
is validated through simulation. Using a simulation
model, the performance of our proposed scheme is com-
pared with three existing C-RAN resource sharing sche-
mes—the BPUV scheme [4], JCCN scheme [9], and
CPRS scheme [10]. All schemes are implemented with a
polynomial time computational complexity.
5.1 Simulation model, parameters, and scenario
In this study, we used the simulation tool MATLAB to de-
velop our simulation model. MATLAB is one of the most
widely used tools in a number of scientific simulation
fields, such as digital processing, telecommunications, and
mathematical analysis. In particular, MATLAB’s high-level
syntax and dynamic types are ideal for model prototyping.
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The assumptions implemented in our simulation model
are as follows.
 The simulated model was assumed as a C-RAN sys-
tem with one VBP, 10 SBSs, and 100 MUs.
 The process for new application service requests
was Poisson with rate σ (applications/MU/s), and
the range of offered load was varied from 0 to 3.0.
 The total capacity of resources were CPU (d1 =
3.6 GHz), memory (d2 = 240 Mbyte), storage (d3 =
480 Gbyte), and bandwidth (d1 = 30 Mbps).
 System performance measures obtained on the basis
of 50 simulation runs were plotted as a function of
the offered load.
 Each application service had its own application
type and requires different resource requirements.
They were generated with equal probability.
 The durations of services were exponentially
distributed.
 SBSs had the pre-defined minimum and maximum
resource unit prices.
 For simplicity, we assumed the absence of noise or
physical obstacles in our experiments.
In order to emulate a real C-RAN system environment
and for a fair comparison, application types, characteris-
tics, and system parameters are carefully selected for a
realistic simulation scenario. Table 1 shows the application
types and system parameters used in our simulation.
5.2 Simulation results
As mentioned earlier, the BPUV scheme [4], JCCN
scheme [9], and CPRS scheme [10] have been recently
published and introduced unique challenges to effi-
ciently solve the resource sharing problem in C-RAN
systems. However, they are successful only in certain cir-
cumstances. Compared to these schemes, we can con-
firm the superiority of our proposed hierarchical game
approach.
Figure 2 shows the normalized payoff of each
scheme. It is measured as a normalized utility sum of
all game players. To maximize the C-RAN system
Table 1 Application and system parameters used in the simulation experiment
Application type Applications Resource type Minimum resource requirement Maximum resource requirement
I Voice telephony CPU 30 MHz 60 MHz
Memory 12 Mbyte 24 Mbyte
Storage 4 Gbyte 8 Gbyte
Bandwidth 128 K 512 K
II Video phone CPU 60 MHz 120 MHz
Memory 24 Mbyte 48 Mbyte
Storage 8 Gbyte 16 Gbyte
Bandwidth 256 K 640 K
III Remote login CPU 15 MHz 40 MHz
Memory 6 Mbyte 12 Mbyte
Storage 2 Gbyte 4 Gbyte
Bandwidth 64 K 384 K
IV Tele-conference CPU 60 MHz 150 MHz
Memory 24 Mbyte 96 Mbyte
Storage 8 Gbyte 32 Gbyte
Bandwidth 256 K 896 K
Parameter Value Description
n 10 The number of SBSs
m 10 The number of MUs in each SBS
l 4 The number of resources
mp , Mp 0.5 , 2 The pre-defined minimum and maximum price boundaries
ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4 1.5, 1.2, 1, 1.5 Willingness to pay the price for each resource
ε 0.3 The pre-defined bound for strategy stability
Parameter Initial Description Values
UP 1 The unit price for each resource Dynamically adjustable
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performance, payoff is an important performance
metric. Under various application service requests,
the VBU, SBSs, and MUs repeatedly interact with
each other to effectively share the C-RAN resources.
Therefore, our hierarchical game-based approach ef-
fectively controls resources and could lead to a higher
payoff than other existing methods.
Figure 3 presents the resource efficiency in the C-
RAN system. In general, resource efficiency is the rate of
actively used resource amount over the total resource
amount. A key observation from the results shown in
Fig. 3 is that all the schemes have similar trends. This
trend implies that under higher service requests, a better
resource efficiency is obtained. This is intuitively correct.
Fig. 2 Normalized payoff
Fig. 3 C-RAN resource efficiency
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According to the coopetition approach, the proposed
scheme is flexible to sense the dynamic changing system
environment while improving the resource efficiency.
From the simulation results, we can see that our pro-
posed scheme effectively shares C-RAN resources while
maintaining a higher resource efficiency than other
existing schemes.
The curves in Fig. 4 show the performance analysis in
terms of throughput loss ratio. In this study, throughput
loss ratio is defined as the percentage of possible system
outcome that is lost through ineffective resource opera-
tions. The purpose is to enhance the C-RAN throughput
system through suitable consequences of coopetition in-
teractions. Based on the feedback interaction process,
our scheme constantly monitors the current C-RAN sys-
tem conditions and efficiently solves the resource shar-
ing problems. When designing an effective resource
sharing mechanism for the C-RAN system, it is a highly
desirable property. From the simulation results, the main
observation is that we can maintain a lower throughput
loss ratio than other existing schemes.
Figure 5 presents the performance comparison in
terms of QoS satisfaction probability. From the view-
point of MUs, this is a very important factor. In this
study, it is estimated as the percentage of the success-
fully serviced applications. To improve the MUs’ satis-
faction level, our game-based approach iteratively
interacts with the current system conditions and adjusts
the allocated resource in a step-by-step manner. The
simulation results show that the proposed scheme
achieves a higher QoS satisfaction probability than other
existing schemes.
5.3 Analysis and discussion
In summary, the simulation analysis obtained from Figs. 2,
3, 4, and 5 shows the performance trends of all the
schemes. They are very similar. This is because the main
design goals of all the schemes are the same. However,
based on the two-level Indian buffet game approach, the
proposed scheme adaptively responds to the current C-
RAN system conditions in a distributed manner. There-
fore, we can say that the proposed scheme is much more
flexible, adaptable, and able to sense the current C-RAN
environment. Therefore, as expected, we achieve a better
C-RAN system performance than the BPUV scheme [4],
JCCN scheme [9], and CPRS scheme [10].
In general, many existing schemes are one-sided pro-
tocols and strongly specialized for specific control issues.
The existing schemes in [4, 9, 10] cannot adaptively esti-
mate the current C-RAN system conditions and resolved
the C-RAN resource sharing problem by using fixed sys-
tem parameters. However, the proposed scheme is quite
adaptive to a dynamic C-RAN system according to the
two-level game-based online approach. Therefore, we
can provide the flexibility and adaptability for the
current system conditions. To estimate the flexibility
and adaptability, we define a weighted flexibility and
adaptability (W) as a performance metric for overall per-
formance and study the performance of different
schemes based on this metric. Let N_P be the
Fig. 4 Throughput loss ratio
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normalized payoff, R_E be the resource efficiency, and
S_P be the QoS satisfaction probability. Let ςN_P, ςR_E,
and ςS_P be the relative weights for the three perform-
ance measures. Here, we define the W based on the
weights ςN_P = 0.4, ςR_E = 0.3, and ςS_P = 0.3 as
W ¼ ςNP  NP
 þ ςRE  RE þ ςSP  S  ð11Þ
Figure 6 shows the weighted flexibility and adaptability
( W ). Based on the Indian buffet game model, the
proposed scheme can manage the C-RAN resource fairly
well while achieving a higher performance. This result
clearly shows that the proposed scheme is quite flexible
and adaptable for real C-RAN system operations.
6 Conclusions
Efficient and fine-grained resource sharing becomes an
increasingly important and attractive control issue for
new-generation C-RAN systems. In this work, we
propose a novel multi-resource sharing scheme, which is
Fig. 5 QoS satisfaction probability
Fig. 6 Weighted flexibility and adaptability (W)
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framed as a two-level Indian buffet game model: the
upper-level Indian game is played among VBP-SBSs, and
the lower-level Indian game is played among SBSs-MUs.
Based on the hierarchical interaction mechanism, the
VBP, SBSs, and MUs are intertwined and make decisions
during the step-by-step interactive feedback process.
The novelty of our work lies in the fact that we develop
a new resource sharing paradigm and apply this para-
digm to control the C-RAN environment while compar-
ing its performance to other existing schemes. From the
simulation results, we can claim that our proposed ap-
proach effectively works to improve the system efficiency
and utilization of resource usage in dynamically change-
able C-RAN environments.
In this study, only a specific implementation case of
the Indian buffet game is addressed as a restricted ver-
sion. However, there are insights that can be applied to
open questions in the field of various resource sharing
research areas. Therefore, our work opens a door to
some interesting extensions. For the future work, rev-
enue sharing algorithms with cooperative game models
can be implemented. Another issue for further study is
how the quality of experience (QoE) could be resolved
with the original QoS in C-RAN systems.
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no competing interests.
Author’ contributions
SK is a sole author of this work and ES (i.e., participated in the design of the
study and performed the statistical analysis).
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the MSIP (Ministry of Science, ICT and Future
Planning), Korea, under the ITRC (Information Technology Research Center)
support program (IITP-2015-H8501-15-1018) supervised by the IITP (Institute for
Information & communications Technology Promotion) and was supported by
Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of
Korea(NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education (NRF-2015R1D1A1A01060835)
Received: 16 July 2015 Accepted: 20 December 2015
References
1. T Sigwele, P Pillai, YF Hu, Call admission control in cloud radio access
networks, in IEEE FiCloud’2014, 2014, pp. 31–36
2. Z Htike, CS Hong, S Lee, The life cycle of the rendezvous problem of
cognitive radio ad hoc networks: a survey. JCSE 7(2), 81–88 (2013)
3. W Zhu, C Lee, A new approach to web data mining based on cloud
computing. JCSE 8(4), 181–186 (2014)
4. M Qian, W Hardjawana, J Shi, B Vucetic, Baseband processing units
virtualization for cloud radio access networks. IEEE Wireless Commun.
Letters 4(2), 189–192 (2015)
5. Sungwook Kim, Game theory applications in network design (IGI Global, 2014)
6. J Chunxiao, C Yan, G Yang, KJR Liu, Indian buffet game with non-Bayesian
social learning, in IEEE GlobalSIP’2013, 2013, pp. 309–312
7. C Jiang, Y Chen, Y Gao, KJR Liu, Indian buffet game with negative network
externality and non-Bayesian social learning. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern.
45(4), 609–623 (2015)
8. S Kim, Learning based spectrum sharing algorithms by using coopetition
game approach. Wirel. Pers. Commun. 82(3), 1799–1808 (2015)
9. Y Zhiyuan, FR Yu, B Shengrong, Joint cloud computing and wireless
networks operations: a game theoretic approach, in IEEE GLOBECOM, 2014,
pp. 4977–4982
10. D Niyato, AV Vasilakos, K Zhu, Resource and revenue sharing with coalition
formation of cloud providers: game theoretic approach, in IEEE/ACM
CCGrid’2011, 2011, pp. 215–224
11. A Checko, HL Christiansen, Y Yan, L Scolari, G Kardaras, MS Berger, L
Dittmann, Cloud RAN for mobile networks—a technology overview. IEEE
Commun. Surveys Tutorials 17(1), 405–426 (2015)
12. Y Kamijo, A two-step shapley value in a cooperative game with a coalition
structure. Int. Game Theory Rev. 11(2), 207–214 (2009)
13. W Lee, X Lin, R Schober, VWS Wong, Direct electricity trading in smart grid:
a coalitional game analysis. IEEE J Selected Areas Commun. 32(7), 1398–
1411 (2014)
14. X Wang, H Schulzrinne, Incentive-compatible adaptation of Internet real-
time multimedia. IEEE J Selected Areas Commun. 23(2), 417–436 (2005)
15. N Feng, S-C Mau, NB Mandayam, Pricing and power control for joint
network-centric and user-centric radio resource management. IEEE Trans.
Commun. 52(9), 1547–1557 (2004)
16. H Yang, Sensitivity analysis for the elastic-demand network equilibrium
problem with applications. Transp. Res. 31(1), 55–70 (1997)
17. H Yang, Traffic restraint, road pricing and network equilibrium. Transp. Res.
B Methodol. 31(4), 303–314 (1997)
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
Kim EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:3 Page 12 of 12
